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AUTOCRATIC STRATEGIES FOR ITERATED GAMES WITH ARBITRARY ACTION
SPACES
ALEX MCAVOY AND CHRISTOPH HAUERT
Abstract. The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma sparked
a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions.
These remarkable strategies, however, are known to exist only in games in which players choose between
two alternative actions such as “cooperate” and “defect.” Here we introduce a broader class of autocratic
strategies by extending zero-determinant strategies to iterated games with more general action spaces. We
use the continuous Donation Game as an example, which represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
that intuitively extends to a continuous range of cooperation levels. Surprisingly, despite the fact that
the opponent has infinitely many donation levels from which to choose, a player can devise an autocratic
strategy to enforce a linear relationship between his or her payoff and that of the opponent even when
restricting his or her actions to merely two discrete levels of cooperation. In particular, a player can use
such a strategy to extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent. Therefore, although the action
space of the continuous Donation Game dwarfs that of the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, players can still
devise relatively simple autocratic and, in particular, extortionate strategies.
1. Introduction
Game theory provides a powerful framework to study interactions between individuals (“players”). Among
the most interesting types of interactions are social dilemmas, which result from conflicts of interest between
individuals and groups (Dawes, 1980; Van Lange et al., 2013). Perhaps the most well-studied model of a
social dilemma is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). A two-player game with actions,
C (“cooperate”) and D (“defect”), and payoff matrix,
˜ C D
C R S
D T P
¸
, (1)
is said to be a Prisoner’s Dilemma if T ą R ą P ą S (Axelrod, 1984). In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, defection
is the dominant action, yet the players can realize higher payoffs from mutual cooperation (R) than they
can from mutual defection (P ), resulting in a conflict of interest between the individual and the pair, which
characterizes social dilemmas. Thus, in a one-shot game (i.e. a single encounter), two opponents have an
incentive to defect against one another, but the outcome of mutual defection (the unique Nash equilibrium)
is suboptimal for both players.
One proposed mechanism for the emergence of cooperation in games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
is direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Nowak, 2006b), which entails repeated encounters between players and
allows for reciprocation of cooperative behaviors. In an iterated game, a player might forgo the temptation
to defect in the present due to the threat of future retaliation–“the shadow of the future”–or the possibility
of future rewards for cooperating (Axelrod, 1984; Delton et al., 2011), phenomena for which there is both
theoretical and empirical support (Heide and Miner, 1992; Dal Bo´, 2005). One example of a strategy for the
iterated game is to copy the action of the opponent in the previous round (“tit-for-tat”) (Axelrod, 1984).
Alternatively, a player might choose to retain his or her action from the previous round if and only if the
most recent payoff was R or T (“win-stay, lose-shift”) (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). These examples are
among the simplest and most successful strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Nowak, 2006a).
In a landmark paper, Press and Dyson (2012) deduce the existence of zero-determinant strategies, which
allow a single player to exert much more control over this game than previously thought possible. Since
their introduction, these strategies have been extended to cover multiplayer social dilemmas (Hilbe et al.,
2014b; Pan et al., 2015) and temporally-discounted games (Hilbe et al., 2015a). Moreover, zero-determinant
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strategies have been studied in the context of evolutionary game theory (Hilbe et al., 2013a; Adami and
Hintze, 2013; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013; Szolnoki and Perc, 2014; Hilbe et al., 2015b), adaptive dynamics
(Hilbe et al., 2013b), and human behavioral experiments (Hilbe et al., 2014a). In each of these studies, the
game is assumed to have only two actions: cooperate and defect. In fact, the qualifier “zero-determinant”
actually reflects this assumption because these strategies force a matrix determinant to vanish for action
spaces with only two options. We show here that this assumption is unnecessary.
More specifically, suppose that players X and Y interact repeatedly with no limit on the number of
interactions. For games with two actions, C and D, a memory-one strategy for player X is a vector,
p “ ppCC , pCD, pDC , pDDqᵀ, where pxy is the probability that X cooperates following an outcome in which
X plays x and Y plays y. Let sX “ pR,S, T, P qᵀ and sY “ pR, T, S, P qᵀ be the payoff vectors for players X
and Y , respectively, and let α, β, and γ be fixed constants. Press and Dyson (2012) show that if there is a
constant, φ, for which
rp :“
¨˚
˚˝pCC ´ 1pCD ´ 1
pDC
pDD
‹˛‹‚“ φ pαsX ` βsY ` γq , (2)
then X can unilaterally enforce the linear relationship αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 on the average payoffs, piX and
piY , by playing p. A strategy, p, that satisfies Eq. (2) is known as a “zero-determinant” strategy due to the
fact that rp causes a particular matrix determinant to vanish (Press and Dyson, 2012). However, what is
important about these strategies is not that they cause some matrix determinant to vanish, but rather that
they unilaterally enforce a linear relationship on expected payoffs. Therefore, we refer to these strategies and
their generalization to arbitrary action spaces as autocratic strategies. Of particular interest are extortionate
strategies, which ensure that a player receives an unfair share of the payoffs exceeding the payoff at the Nash
equilibrium (Stewart and Plotkin, 2012). Hence, if P is the payoff for mutual defection in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, then p is a an extortionate strategy for player X if p enforces the equation piX ´P “ χ ppiY ´ P q
for some extortion factor, χ ě 1.
The most common extensions of finite action sets are continuous action spaces. An element s P r0,Ks
represents a player’s investment or cooperation level (up to some maximum, K), such as the amount a
player invests in a public good (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005); the volume of blood one vampire bat donates
to another (Wilkinson, 1984); the amount of resources used by microbes to produce siderophores (West and
Buckling, 2003); or the effort expended in intraspecies grooming (Hemelrijk, 1994; Akinyi et al., 2013). It
is important to note that games with continuous action spaces can yield qualitatively different results than
their discrete counterparts. For example, the strategy “raise-the-stakes” initially offers a small investment
in Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions and subsequently raises the contribution in discrete increments if the
opponent matches or betters the investment (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998). However, in a continuous action
space, raise-the-stakes evolves into defection due to the fact that another strategy can be arbitrarily close–in
terms of the initial investment and subsequent increases in contribution–yet exhibit qualitatively different
behavior (Killingback and Doebeli, 1999). In particular, raise-the-stakes succeeds in a discrete action space
but fails in a continuous one.
Akin (2015) calls the vector, rp, of Eq. (2) a Press-Dyson vector. For continuous action spaces, the payoff
vectors, sX and sY , must be replaced by payoff functions, uX px, yq and uY px, yq. That is, ui px, yq denotes
the payoff to player i when X plays x and Y plays y. The analogue of the linear combination αsX`βsY `γ is
the function αuX `βuY ` γ. Here, we formally define a Press-Dyson function that extends the Press-Dyson
vector to iterated games with arbitrary action spaces. This extension allows one to deduce the existence
of strategies that unilaterally enforce linear relationships on the payoffs in more general iterated games. In
particular, autocratic (or zero-determinant strategies) are not peculiar to games with two (or even finitely
many) actions. Moreover, under mild conditions, player X can enforce a linear relationship on expected
payoffs by choosing a memory-one strategy that plays just two actions, despite the fact that the opponent
may have an infinite number of actions from which to choose. We give examples of such autocratic strategies
in the continuous Donation Game, which represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma but with an
extended, continuous action space.
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Figure 1. Reactive, memory-one strategies, σX rx, ys psq “ σX rys psq, for a game whose
action space is the interval r0,Ks. In (A), player X uses Y ’s action in the previous round
to determine the probabilities with which she plays 0 and K in the next round. As Y ’s
previous action (investment level), y, increases, so does the probability that X uses K
in the subsequent round. Since X plays only these two actions, this strategy is called a
two-point strategy. In (B), player X uses Y ’s action in the previous round to determine
the probability density function she uses to devise her next action. In contrast to (A),
which depicts a strategy concentrated on just two actions, the strategy depicted in (B) is
concentrated on a continuous range of actions in r0,Ks. As Y ’s previous action, y, increases,
the mean of the density function governing X’s next action increases, which indicates that X
is more willing reciprocate by increasing her investment (action) in response to Y increasing
his investment.
2. Autocratic strategies
Consider a two-player iterated game with actions spaces, SX and SY , and payoff functions, uX px, yq and
uY px, yq, for players X and Y , respectively. Players X and Y interact repeatedly (infinitely many times),
deriving a payoff at each round based on uX and uY . We treat games with temporally-discounted payoffs,
which means that for some discounting factor λ with 0 ă λ ă 1, a payoff of 1 at time t ` τ is treated the
same as a payoff of λτ at time t (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Alternatively, one may interpret this
game as having a finite number of rounds, where in any given round λ denotes the probability of another
round (Nowak, 2006b), which results in an expected game length of 1{ p1´ λq rounds.
Suppose that, for each t ě 0, xt and yt are the actions used by players X and Y at time t. Then,
irrespective of the interpretation of λ, the average payoff to player X is
piX “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λtuX pxt, ytq . (3)
The payoff to player Y , piY , is obtained by replacing uX with uY in Eq. (3). If the strategies of X and
Y are stochastic, then the payoffs are random variables with expectations, piX and piY (see Supporting
Information). Of particular interest are memory-one strategies, which are probabilistic strategies that
depend on only the most recent outcome of the game. If σX is a memory-one strategy for X, then we denote
by σX rx, ys psq the probability that X uses s after X plays x and Y plays y (see Fig. 1).
The proofs of the existence of zero-determinant strategies (both in games with and without discounting)
rely heavily on the fact that the action space is finite (Press and Dyson, 2012; Hilbe et al., 2015a; Akin, 2015).
In particular, it remains unclear whether zero-determinant strategies are consequences of the finiteness of
the action space or instances of a more general concept. Here, we introduce autocratic strategies as an
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extension of zero-determinant strategies to discounted games with arbitrary action spaces. The traditional,
undiscounted case is recovered in the limit λÑ 1.
Theorem 1 (Autocratic strategies). Suppose that σX rx, ys is a memory-one strategy for player X and let
σ0X be player X’s initial action. If, for some bounded function, ψ, the equation
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (4)
holds for each x P SX and y P SY , then σ0X and σX rx, ys together enforce the linear payoff relationship
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 (5)
for any strategy of player Y . In other words, the pair
`
σ0X , σX rx, ys
˘
is an autocratic strategy for player X.
Note that the initial action, σ0X , in Eq. (4) becomes irrelevant without discounting (λÑ 1). The function
ψ may be interpreted as a “scaling function” that is used to ensure σX rx, ys is a feasible memory-one
strategy; that is, ψ plays the same role as the scalar φ in Eq. (2), which is chosen so that the entries of
p are all between 0 and 1. We call the right-hand side of Eq. (4) a Press-Dyson function, which extends
the Press-Dyson vector of Eq. (2) to arbitrary action spaces (see Supporting Information). In contrast
to action spaces with two options (“cooperate” and “defect”, for instance), autocratic strategies are defined
only implicitly via Eq. (4) for general action spaces (and actually already for games with just three actions).
For each x and y, the integral,
ş
sPSX ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq, may be thought of as the weighted average
(expectation) of ψ with respect to σX rx, ys. Since the integral is taken against σX rx, ys, in general one cannot
solve Eq. (4) explicitly for σX rx, ys, so it is typically not possible to directly specify all pairs
`
σ0X , σX rx, ys
˘
that unilaterally enforce Eq. (5).
Interestingly, under mild conditions, σX can be chosen to be a remarkably simple “two-point” strategy,
concentrated on just two actions, s1 and s2 (see Corollary 2 in Supporting Information). Player X can
enforce Eq. (5) by playing either s1 or s2 in each round, with probabilities determined by the outcome of
the previous round (see Fig. 1(A)). Thus, a strategy of this form uses the (memory-one) history of previous
play only to adjust the relative weights placed on s1 and s2, while s1 and s2 themselves remain unchanged.
Unlike in the case of arbitrary σX , for fixed ψ, s1, and s2, it is possible to explicitly solve for all autocratic,
two-point strategies on s1 and s2 satisfying Eq. (4) (see Remark 3 in Supporting Information). In a
two-action game, every memory-one strategy is concentrated on two points, which explains why games like
the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma fail to capture the implicit nature of autocratic strategies.
3. Continuous Donation Game
In the classical Donation Game, cooperators pay a cost, c, to provide a benefit, b, to the opponent
(Sigmund, 2010). Defectors make no donations and pay no costs. The payoff matrix for this game is given
by Eq. (1) with R “ b ´ c, S “ ´c, T “ b, and P “ 0. For b ą c ą 0 a social dilemma arises because the
payoff for mutual defection (the Nash equilibrium) is strictly less than the payoff for mutual cooperation,
yet both players are tempted to shirk donations, which represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In
the iterated (and undiscounted) version of the Donation Game, the main result of Press and Dyson (2012)
implies that a memory-one strategy for player X, p “ ppCC , pCD, pDC , pDDqᵀ, enforces piX ´κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq
for some κ and χ ě 1 whenever there exists a scalar, φ, for which
pCC “ 1´ φ pχ´ 1q pb´ c´ κq ; (6a)
pCD “ 1´ φ pχb` c´ pχ´ 1qκq ; (6b)
pDC “ φ pb` χc` pχ´ 1qκq ; (6c)
pDD “ φ pχ´ 1qκ. (6d)
The term χ denotes the extortion factor and κ the baseline payoff, i.e. the payoff of p against itself (Hilbe
et al., 2014a). For example, if κ “ 0 and χ ě 1, then Eq. (6) defines an extortionate strategy, which
unilaterally enforces piX “ χpiY as long as φ is sufficiently small. In this sense, φ acts as a scaling factor to
ensure each coordinate of p falls between 0 and 1.
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Instead of discrete “levels” of cooperation, the continuous Donation Game admits a range of cooperation
levels, r0,Ks, with K ą 0 indicating maximal cooperation. The costs and benefits associated with s,
denoted by c psq and b psq, respectively, are nondecreasing functions of s and, in analogy to the discrete case,
satisfy b psq ą c psq for s ą 0 and cp0q “ bp0q “ 0 (Killingback et al., 1999; Wahl and Nowak, 1999a,b;
Killingback and Doebeli, 2002; Doebeli et al., 2004). The payoff matrix, Eq. (1) is replaced by payoff
functions, with the payoffs to players X and Y for playing x against y being uX px, yq :“ b pyq ´ c pxq and
uY px, yq “ uX py, xq “ b pxq ´ c pyq, respectively (i.e. the game is symmetric). For this natural extension
of the classical Donation Game, we first show the existence of autocratic and, in particular, extortionate
strategies, that play only x “ 0 and x “ K and ignore all other cooperation levels.
3.1. Two-point autocratic strategies. For the continuous Donation Game, we show, using Theorem 1,
that player X can unilaterally enforce piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq for fixed χ and κ by playing only two actions:
x “ 0 (defect) and x “ K (fully cooperate). Conditioned on the fact that X plays only 0 and K, a
memory-one strategy for player X is defined by a reaction function, p px, yq, which denotes the probability
that X plays K following an outcome in which X plays x P t0,Ku and Y plays y P r0,Ks; 1´ p px, yq is the
probability that X plays 0 (i.e. defects). Player X’s initial action is determined by the probability, p0, that
X plays x “ K in the first round.
Consider the function ψ psq :“ ´χb psq´c psq and suppose that 0 ď κ ď b pKq´c pKq. If player X’s initial
action is x “ K with probability p0 and x “ 0 with probability 1´ p0 then, for sufficiently weak discounting
or, equivalently, sufficiently many rounds of interaction,
λ ě b pKq ` χc pKq
χb pKq ` c pKq , (7)
and for p0 falling within a feasible range (see Eq. (SI.60) in Supporting Information), the reaction
function
ppx, yq “ 1
λ
ˆ
b pyq ` χc pyq ` pχ´ 1qκ
χb pKq ` c pKq ´ p1´ λq p0
˙
, (8)
defines a memory-one strategy,
σ0X “ p1´ p0q δ0 ` p0δK ; (9a)
σX rx, ys “ p1´ p px, yqq δ0 ` p px, yq δK , (9b)
where δs denotes the Dirac measure centered at s P r0,Ks, that enforces the equation piX´κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq. If
there is no discounting (i.e. λ “ 1), then the initial move is irrelevant and p0 can be anything in the interval
r0, 1s. Note that Eq. (8) represents a reactive strategy (Nowak and Sigmund, 1990) because X conditions
her play on only the previous move of the opponent (see Fig. 4(B)).
For κ “ 0 and χ ě 1, Eq. (8) defines an extortionate strategy, σX , which guarantees player X a fixed
share of the payoffs over the payoff for mutual defection. If χ “ 1 (and κ is arbitrary), then this strategy is
fair since player X ensures the opponent has a payoff equal to her own (Hilbe et al., 2014b). On the other
hand, if κ “ b pKq ´ c pKq and χ ě 1, then Eq. (8) defines a generous (or “compliant”) strategy (Stewart
and Plotkin, 2012; Hilbe et al., 2013a). By playing a generous strategy, player X ensures that her payoff
is at most that of her opponent’s. For each of these types of strategies, the probability that X reacts to y
by cooperating is increasing as a function of y. In particular, X is most likely to cooperate after Y fully
cooperates (y “ K) and is most likely to defect after Y defects (y “ 0). Moreover, this single choice of
ψ psq “ ´χb psq ´ c psq demonstrates the existence of each of these three classes of autocratic strategies for
the continuous Donation Game provided λ is sufficiently weak.
Similarly, if ψ psq “ b psq and λ ě c pKq {b pKq, then
p px, yq “ 1
λ
ˆ
c pyq ` γ
b pKq ´ p1´ λq p0
˙
, (10)
defines a reaction probability that allows X to set piY “ γ for any γ satisfying 0 ď γ ď b pKq´c pKq, provided
p0 falls within a suitable range (see Eq. (SI.63) in Supporting Information). A strategy that allows a
player to single-handedly set the score of the opponent is termed an equalizer strategy (Boerlijst et al., 1997;
Hilbe et al., 2013a). However, no autocratic strategy allows player X to set her own score via Eq. (4) (see
Supporting Information). These results are consistent with the observations of Press and Dyson (2012)
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Figure 2. Two-point extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the continu-
ous Donation Game with action spaces SX “ t0, 2u and SY “ r0, 2s and discount-
ing factor λ “ 0.95. The costs are linear, c psq “ 2s, and the benefits saturating,
b pc psqq “ 5 `1´ e´cpsq˘. The light blue regions represent the feasible payoff pairs, ppiY , piXq,
for the repeated, continuous Donation Game when X takes advantage of the entire action
space, r0, 2s, and the hatched regions represent the feasible payoff pairs when X uses just
t0, 2u. In each panel, the simulation results were obtained by plotting the average payoffs
for a fixed autocratic strategy against 1000 randomly chosen memory-one strategies. (A)
depicts extortionate strategies enforcing piX “ χpiY with χ “ 2 (black) and χ “ 3 (blue).
(B) illustrates generous strategies enforcing b p2q ´ c p2q ´ piX “ χ pb p2q ´ c p2q ´ piY q with
χ “ 2 (black) and χ “ 3 (blue). (C) demonstrates equalizer strategies enforcing piY “ γ
with γ “ 0 (black) and γ “ b p2q ´ c p2q (blue). From (A) and (B), it is clear that neither
mutual extortion nor mutual generosity is a Nash equilibrium since, when both players use
extortionate or generous strategies, either player can single-handedly improve the payoffs of
both players by deviating from his or her strategy. When both players together use the same
action, the best outcome occurs at an investment level of m “ 12 log 5 ă 2, which results in
a payoff of b pmq ´ c pmq ą b p2q ´ c p2q to both players (yellow dot).
that, in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma without discounting, player X cannot set her own score but can
set player Y ’s score to anything between the payoffs for mutual defection and mutual cooperation.
3.2. Deterministic autocratic strategies. One feature of two-point autocratic strategies is that they
allow a player to exert control over the payoffs of a repeated game while ignoring most of the action space.
One drawback is that they restrict the region of feasible game payoffs (see Fig. 2). This shortcoming of
two-point strategies leads to a new class of strategies called deterministic strategies, which are perhaps the
simplest alternatives to two-point strategies.
A deterministic strategy requires a player to respond to a history of previous play by playing an action
with certainty rather than probabilistically. For example, a memory-one deterministic strategy for player
X is defined by (i) an initial action, x0 P SX , and (ii) a reaction function, rX : SX ˆ SY Ñ SX , such
that X plays rX px, yq following an outcome in which X plays x and Y plays y. One well-known example
of a deterministic strategy is tit-for-tat in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is defined by x0 “ C
(initially cooperate) and rX px, yq “ y (do what the opponent did in the previous round). Tit-for-tat is also
an autocratic strategy since it enforces the fair relationship piX “ piY (Stewart and Plotkin, 2013).
For general memory-one deterministic strategies, the condition for the existence of autocratic strategies,
Eq. (4), becomes
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λψ
`
rX px, yq˘´ p1´ λqψ px0q . (11)
If Eq. (11) holds for each x P SX and y P SY , then the deterministic strategy defined by x0 and rX enforces
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0. Thus, in order to enforce piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq for 0 ď κ ď b pKq ´ c pKq, one may
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Figure 3. Deterministic extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the continuous
Donation Game with action spaces SX “ SY “ r0, 2s and discounting factor λ “ 0.95. As
in Fig. 2, the simulation results in each panel were obtained by plotting the average payoffs
for a fixed autocratic strategy against 1000 randomly chosen memory-one strategies. (A)
and (B) demonstrate extortionate and generous strategies, respectively, with χ “ 2 (black)
and χ “ 3 (blue). (C) shows equalizer strategies enforcing piY “ γ with γ “ 0 (black)
and γ “ b p2q ´ c p2q (blue). Since deterministic strategies allow player X to use a much
larger portion of the action space than just 0 and K, we observe that the linear relationships
enforced by deterministic autocratic strategies cover a greater portion of the feasible region
than do two-point strategies. The best outcome when both players use the same action
occurs at m “ 12 log 5 ă 2, which results in a mutual payoff of b pmq ´ c pmq ą b p2q ´ c p2q
(yellow dot).
choose ψ psq :“ ´χb psq ´ c psq and use the reaction function
rX px, yq “ ψ´1
ˆ´b pyq ´ χc pyq ´ pχ´ 1qκ´ p1´ λqψ px0q
λ
˙
, (12)
where ψ´1 p¨ ¨ ¨ q denotes the inverse of the function ψ, provided λ satisfies Eq. (7) and x0 falls within a
feasible range (see Eq. (SI.65) in Supporting Information).
Similarly, to enforce piY “ γ for 0 ď γ ď b pKq´ c pKq, one may choose ψ psq :“ b psq and use the reaction
function
rX px, yq “ ψ´1
ˆ
c pyq ` γ ´ p1´ λqψ px0q
λ
˙
, (13)
provided λ ě c pKq {b pKq and, again, x0 falls within a feasible range (see Eq. (SI.67) in Supporting
Information).
Examples of deterministic extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies are given in Fig. 3. It is evident
that deterministic strategies increase the feasible region in which linear payoff relationships can be enforced
as compared to their two-point counterparts (c.f. Fig. 2).
4. Discussion
In games with two actions, zero-determinant strategies are typically defined via a technical condition such
as Eq. (2) (Press and Dyson, 2012; Hilbe et al., 2015a). This definition makes generalizations to games with
larger action spaces difficult because Eq. (2) makes sense only for two-action games. Therefore, we introduce
the more general term autocratic strategy for any strategy that unilaterally enforces a linear relationship
on expected payoffs. Of course, this linear relationship is precisely what makes strategies satisfying Eq. (2)
interesting.
Theorem 1 provides a condition for the existence of autocratic strategies for games with general action
spaces. We illustrate this phenomenon with a continuous-action-space extension of the classical Donation
Game, which represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The existing literature on zero-determinant
strategies for the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma provides no way of treating this continuous extension of the
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Donation Game. However, Theorem 1 makes no assumptions on the action space of the game and thus
applies to the continuous Donation Game as well as its classical counterpart.
Surprisingly, in many cases a player can enforce a linear relationship on expected payoffs by playing
only two actions, despite the fact that the opponent may have infinitely many actions available to use
(Corollary 2 in Supporting Information). We demonstrate that the conditions guaranteeing the existence
of extortionate, generous, fair, and equalizer strategies in the continuous Donation Game are in fact similar to
those of the two-action case. However, despite the simplicity of these two-point strategies, a player needs to
know how to respond to every possible move of the opponent; knowledge of how to respond to just defection
(y “ 0) and full cooperation (y “ K) does not suffice. Therefore, although a player using a two-point
strategy plays only x “ 0 and x “ K, these strategies represent a departure from the classical Donation
Game.
Another important difference is that, whereas in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma mutual generosity
represents a symmetric Nash equilibrium (Hilbe et al., 2015a), this need not be the case in the continuous
Donation Game. Instead, mutual generosity results in a payoff of b pKq ´ c pKq for each player, where K is
the maximal investment, but intermediate levels of cooperation may yield b pmq ´ c pmq ą b pKq ´ c pKq for
m P p0,Kq, i.e. both players fare better if they each invest m instead of K (see Figs. 2 and 3). However,
no player can enforce a generous relationship with baseline payoff κ “ b pmq ´ c pmq because it is outside of
the feasible range for κ (see Supporting Information). Thus, the performance of a generous strategy as
a response to itself depends critically on whether the game has two actions or a continuous range of actions.
Extortionate strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma are not evolutionarily stable (Adami and
Hintze, 2013). Since mutual generosity in the continuous Donation Game need not be a Nash equilibrium, it
follows that generous strategies also need not be evolutionarily stable. Moreover, against human opponents,
extortioners are punished by a refusal to fully cooperate, while generous players provide their opponents
with an incentive to cooperate and fare better in experiments (Hilbe et al., 2014a). Such behavior supports
what one would expect from a player using a fair autocratic strategy enforcing piX “ piY (such as tit-for-
tat): if the opponent ensures piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq for some χ ą 1, then both players get κ. In particular,
fair strategies punish extortion and reward generosity. Based on our results on generous strategies for the
continuous Donation Game, it would be interesting to see whether (human) experiments support the same
conclusion and whether the participants succeed in securing payoffs that exceed those of mutual generosity.
The performance of autocratic strategies in populations, however, is but one perspective on this recently-
discovered class of strategies for repeated games.
In games with two discrete actions, our definition of a Press-Dyson function specializes to a multiple of
the Press-Dyson vector, Crp with C a constant (see Eq. (2) and Supporting Information for details). The
Press-Dyson vector is recovered by normalizing the Press-Dyson function and thus eliminating the constant,
C. However, in games with d actions, this function involves at least d ´ 1 constants, which, for d ą 2,
cannot be eliminated by normalization (see Supporting Information for an example with three actions).
Therefore, based on Theorem 1, in two-action games it is perhaps more appropriate to define a Press-Dyson
vector to be any vector of the form Crp. This distinction for games with two actions is minor, however, and
does not change the fact that Theorem 1 covers all of the known results on the existence of zero-determinant
strategies for repeated games.
More importantly, however, the analysis of iterated games with only two actions completely misses the
fact that autocratic strategies are most naturally presented implicitly via Eq. (4). Even in the case of two
actions, infinitely many autocratic strategies may exist (Press and Dyson, 2012), but their simplistic nature
admits explicit solutions. Our extension shows that, in general, (i) autocratic strategies need not be unique
and (ii) one cannot explicitly list all autocratic strategies that produce a fixed Press-Dyson function. Thus,
for arbitrary action spaces (but already for games with d ą 2 actions), the space of autocratic strategies
is more sophisticated than two-action games suggest. Notwithstanding the intrinsic difficulty in explicitly
specifying all autocratic strategies, our results demonstrate that these strategies exist in a broad class of
games and are not simply consequences of the finiteness of the action space in games such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
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Supporting Information
SI.1. Iterated games with two players and measurable action spaces
By “action space,” we mean a measurable space, S, equipped with a σ-algebra, F pSq (although we suppress
F pSq and refer to the space simply as S). Informally, S is the space of actions, decisions, investments, or
options available to a player at each round of the iterated interaction and could be a finite set, a continuous
interval, or something more complicated. Since the players need not have the same action space, we denote
by SX the space of actions available to player X and by SY the space of actions available to player Y . In
what follows, all functions are assumed to be measurable and bounded.
In each encounter (i.e. “one-shot game”), the players receive payoffs based on a payoff function,
u “ puX , uY q : SX ˆ SY ÝÑ R2. (SI.1)
The first and second coordinate functions, uX and uY , give the payoffs to players X and Y , respectively. An
iterated game between players X and Y consists of a sequence of these one-shot interactions. If, at time t,
player X uses xt P SX and player Y uses yt P SY , then the (normalized) payoff to player X for a sequence
of T ` 1 interactions (from time t “ 0 to t “ T ) is
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λtuX pxt, ytq , (SI.2)
where λ is the discounting factor, 0 ă λ ă 1. The payoff to player Y is obtained by replacing uX by uY
in Eq. (SI.2). Thus, the discounted payoffs, λtuX pxt, ytq, are simply added up and then normalized by a
factor of 1´λ
1´λT`1 to ensure that the payoff for the repeated game is measured in the same units as the payoffs
for individual encounters (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Moreover, provided the series
ř8
t“0 uX pxt, ytq is
Cesa`ro summable, meaning limTÑ8 1T`1
řT
t“0 uX pxt, ytq exists, we have
lim
λÑ1´
p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λtuX pxt, ytq “ lim
TÑ8
1
T ` 1
Tÿ
t“0
uX pxt, ytq (SI.3)
(see Korevaar, 2004). Therefore, payoffs in the undiscounted case may be obtained from the payoffs for
discounted games in the limit λÑ 1´, provided this limit exists (see Hilbe et al., 2015a).
Here, we consider stochastic strategies that condition on the history of play: both players observe the
sequence of play up to the current period and use it to devise an action for the present encounter. In order
to formally define such strategies, we first recall the notion of “history” in a repeated game: a history at
time T is a sequence of action pairs,
hT :“
´
px0, y0q , . . . , pxT´1, yT´1q
¯
, (SI.4)
indicating the sequence of play leading up to the interaction at time T (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In
other words, a history at time T is an element of HT :“śT´1t“0 SX ˆ SY . Let H0 :“ t∅u, where ∅ denotes
the “empty” history (which serves just to indicate that there has been no history of past play, i.e. that
the game has not yet begun). The set of all possible histories is the disjoint union, H :“ ŮTě0HT . For
hT “
´
px0, y0q , . . . , pxT´1, yT´1q
¯
and t ď T ´ 1, let
hTt :“ pxt, ytq ; (SI.5a)
hTďt :“
´
px0, y0q , . . . , pxt, ytq
¯
. (SI.5b)
That is, hTt is the action pair played at time t, and h
Tďt is the “sub-history” of hT until time t ď T .
A pure strategy for player X in the repeated game is a map, H Ñ SX , indicating an action in SX
(deterministically) for each history leading up to the current encounter. More generally, X could look at
the history of past play and use this information to choose an action from SX probabilistically (rather than
deterministically). A strategy of this form is known as a behavioral strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
In terms of H, a behavioral strategy for player X is a map
σX : H ÝÑ ∆ pSXq , (SI.6)
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where ∆ pSXq is the space of probability measures on SX . An important type of behavioral strategy is a
Markov strategy, which is a behavioral strategy, σX , that satisfies σX
“
hT
‰ “ σX “hTT´1‰. That is, a Markov
strategy depends on only the last pair of actions and not on the entire history of play. Note, however, that
a Markov strategy may still depend on t. If σX is a Markov strategy that does not depend on t, then we say
that σX is a stationary (or memory-one) strategy.
Suppose that σX and σY are behavioral strategies for players X and Y , respectively. Consider the map,
σ, defined by the product measure,
σ :“ σX ˆ σY : H ÝÑ ∆ pSX ˆ SY q
: ht ÞÝÑ σX
“
ht
‰ˆ σY “ht‰ . (SI.7)
By the Hahn-Kolmogorov theorem, for each t ě 0 there exists a unique measure, µt, on Ht`1 such that for
each E1 P F pHtq and E P F pSX ˆ SY q,
µt
`
E1 ˆ E˘ “ ż
htPE1
σ
`
ht, E
˘
dσ
`
htďt´2, htt´1
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `htď0, ht1˘ dσ `∅, ht0˘ , (SI.8)
where, for h P H and s P SX ˆ SY , dσ ph, sq denotes the differential of the measure σ ph,´q on SX ˆ SY .
In the case t “ 0, this measure is simply the product of the two initial actions, i.e. µ0 “ σX r∅s ˆ σY r∅s.
From these measures, we obtain a sequence of measures, tνtutě0 Ď ∆ pSX ˆ SY q, defined by
νt pEq :“ µt
`
Ht ˆ E˘ . (SI.9)
Informally, νt pEq is the probability that the action pair at time t is in E Ď SX ˆ SY , averaged over all
histories that lead to E. The sequences, tµtutě0 and tνtutě0, admit a convenient format for the expected
payoffs, piTX and pi
T
Y , to players X and Y , respectively. Before stating this result, we first formally define
expected payoffs for the pT ` 1q-period game (where T ă 8):
Definition 1 (Objective function for a finite game). If σX and σY are behavioral strategies for players X
and Y , respectively, and if σ “ σX ˆ σY (see Eq. (SI.7)), then the objective function (or expected payoff)
for player X in the pT ` 1q-period game is
piTX :“
ż
hT`1PHT`1
«
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λtuX
`
hT`1t
˘ff
dσ
`
hT`1ďT´1, h
T`1
T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `hT`1ď0 , hT`11 ˘ dσ `∅, hT`10 ˘ .
(SI.10)
Using tνtutě0, we can write piTX differently:
Lemma 1. For fixed σX and σY generating tνtutě0, we have
piTX “ 1´ λ1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dνt px, yq . (SI.11)
As a consequence of Lemma 1, we see that limTÑ8 piTX exists since νt is a probability measure andˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dνt px, yq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ď suppx,yqPSXˆSY |uX px, yq| ă 8 (SI.12)
by the fact that uX is bounded. Thus, we define the objective function for an infinite game as follows:
Definition 2 (Objective function for an infinite game). If σX and σY are behavioral strategies for players
X and Y , respectively, and if σ “ σX ˆ σY , then the objective function for player X in the infinite game is
piX :“ lim
TÑ8pi
T
X “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dνt px, yq . (SI.13)
Remark 1. Classically, the objective function of a repeated game with infinitely many rounds is defined
using a distribution over “infinite histories,” which is generated by the players’ strategies for the repeated
12
game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). That is, for H8 :“ś8t“0 SX ˆ SY and some measure, µ P ∆ pH8q, the
objective function of player X is defined by
ż
h8PH8
p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λtuX ph8t q dµ ph8q . (SI.14)
Using Eq. (SI.13) as an objective function for player X, we do not need to worry about what µ is (or if
it even exists for a general action space) since Eq. (SI.14), whenever it is defined, must coincide with Eq.
(SI.13). To see why, suppose that there is a distribution, µ, on H8 that satisfies
µ pE ˆ pSX ˆ SY q ˆ pSX ˆ SY q ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ q “ µT pEq (SI.15)
for each E P F `HT`1˘. Then, by the dominated convergence theorem, Eq. (SI.15), and Eq. (SI.9),
ż
h8PH8
p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λtuX ph8t q dµ ph8q
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
h8PH8
uX ph8t q dµ ph8q
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
ht`1PHt`1
uX
`
ht`1t
˘
dµt
`
ht`1
˘
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dνt px, yq . (SI.16)
Therefore, assuming Lemma 1, the objective function for player X defined by piX :“ limTÑ8 piTX is the same
as the classical objective function for repeated games when the players’ strategies produce a probability
distribution over infinite histories. Typically, the existence of such a distribution depends on S being finite
or the measures in tµtutě0 being inner regular (which allows one to deduce the existence of µ from tµtutě0
using the Kolmogorov extension theorem). In practice, these assumptions are often not unreasonable, but
with Lemma 1, we do not need to worry about the existence of such a distribution.
In order to prove Lemma 1, we first need a simple technical result:
Lemma 2. Suppose that X and Y are measure spaces and σ is a Markov kernel from X to Y. Let µ be a
probability measure on X and consider the measure on Y defined, for E P F pYq, by
ν pEq :“
ż
xPX
σ px,Eq dµ pxq . (SI.17)
For any bounded, measurable function, f : YÑ R, we haveż
yPY
f pyq dν pyq “
ż
xPX
ż
yPY
f pyq dσ px, yq dµ pxq , (SI.18)
where, for each x P X, dσ px, yq denotes the differential of the measure σ px,´q on Y.
Proof. Since f is bounded, there exists a sequence of simple functions, tfnuně1, such that fn Ñ f uniformly
on Y. For each n ě 1, let fn “ řNni“1 cni χEni for some cni P R and Eni P F pYq, where χEni is the characteristic
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function of Eni (meaning χEni pxq “ 1 if x P Eni and χEni pxq “ 0 if x R Eni ). By uniform convergence,ż
yPY
f pyq dν pyq “ lim
nÑ8
ż
yPY
fn pyq dν pyq
“ lim
nÑ8
Nnÿ
i“1
cni ν pEni q
“ lim
nÑ8
Nnÿ
i“1
cni
ż
xPX
σ px,Eni q dµ pxq
“ lim
nÑ8
ż
xPX
Nnÿ
i“1
cni σ px,Eni q dµ pxq
“ lim
nÑ8
ż
xPX
ż
yPY
fn pyq dσ px, yq dµ pxq
“
ż
xPX
ż
yPY
f pyq dσ px, yq dµ pxq , (SI.19)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1. By Lemma 2 and the definitions of µt and νt,
piTX “
ż
hT`1PHT`1
«
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λtuX
`
hT`1t
˘ff
dσ
`
hT`1ďT´1, h
T`1
T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `hT`1ď0 , hT`11 ˘ dσ `∅, hT`10 ˘
“ 1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
hT`1PHT`1
uX
`
hT`1t
˘
dσ
`
hT`1ďT´1, h
T`1
T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `hT`1ď0 , hT`11 ˘ dσ `∅, hT`10 ˘
“ 1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
hT`1PHT`1
uX
`
hT`1t
˘
dµT
`
hT`1
˘
“ 1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
ht`1PHt`1
uX
`
ht`1t
˘
dµt
`
ht`1
˘
“ 1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
ht`1t PSXˆSY
uX
`
ht`1t
˘
dνt
`
ht`1t
˘
“ 1´ λ
1´ λT`1
Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dνt px, yq , (SI.20)
which completes the proof. 
The objective function of Eq. (SI.13), which is obtained using Lemma 1, eliminates the need to deal with
histories when proving our main results for iterated games. With the background on expected payoffs now
established, we turn our attention to the proofs of the results claimed in the main text:
SI.2. Detailed proofs of the main results
Before proving our main results, we state a technical lemma that generalizes Lemma 3.1 of Akin (2015)–
which Hilbe et al. (2014b) refer to as Akin’s Lemma–and Lemma 1 of Hilbe et al. (2015a). This lemma
relates the strategies of the two players, σX and σY , and the (discounted) sequence of play to the initial
action of player X when σX is memory-one. Our proof of this lemma is essentially the same as theirs but in
the broader setting of a measurable action space:
Lemma 3. For any memory-one strategy, σX , and E P F pSXq,
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χE pxq ´ λσX rx, ys pEq
ı
dνt px, yq “ σ0X pEq , (SI.21)
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where σ0X is the initial action of player X.
Proof. By the definition of νt, we haveż
px,yqPSXˆSY
χE pxq dνt px, yq “ νt pE ˆ Sq ; (SI.22a)ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
σX rx, ys pEq dνt px, yq “ νt`1 pE ˆ Sq . (SI.22b)
Therefore, since νt is a probability measure (in particular, at most 1 on any measurable set) for each t,
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χE pxq ´ λσX rx, ys pEq
ı
dνt px, yq
“
8ÿ
t“0
λt
´
νt pE ˆ Sq ´ λνt`1 pE ˆ Sq
¯
“ ν0 pE ˆ Sq ´ lim
tÑ8λ
t`1νt`1 pE ˆ Sq
“ ν0 pE ˆ Sq
“ σ0X pEq , (SI.23)
which completes the proof. 
By the definitions of piX and piY , we have
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ
ı
dνt px, yq . (SI.24)
Since our goal is to establish Theorem 1, which states that player X can enforce the relation αpiX ` βpiY `
γ “ 0 using some σX rx, ys and σ0X , as a first step we show that
ř8
t“0 λt
ş
px,yqPSXˆSY ϕ px, yq dνt px, yq “ş
sPSX ψ psq dσ0X psq for a particular choice of ϕ px, yq. We then deduce Theorem 1 by setting
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ ` p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σ0X psq “ ϕ px, yq (SI.25)
for this known function, ϕ.
Proposition 1. If ψ : SX Ñ R is a bounded, measurable function, then
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq “
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq , (SI.26)
for any memory-one strategy, σX , where σ
0
X is the initial action of player X.
Proof. Since ψ is bounded, there exists a sequence of simple functions, tψnuně1, such that ψn Ñ ψ uniformly
on S. For each n ě 1, let ψn “ řNni“1 cni χEni . Using the uniform convergence of this sequence, together with
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the dominated convergence theorem and Lemma 3, we obtain
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq
“
8ÿ
t“0
λt lim
nÑ8
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψn pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψn psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq
“ lim
nÑ8
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψn pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψn psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq
“ lim
nÑ8
8ÿ
t“0
λt
Nnÿ
i“1
cni
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
χEni pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
χEni psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq
“ lim
nÑ8
8ÿ
t“0
λt
Nnÿ
i“1
cni
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEni pxq ´ λσX rx, ys pEni q
ı
dνt px, yq
“ lim
nÑ8
Nnÿ
i“1
cni
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEni pxq ´ λσX rx, ys pEni q
ı
dνt px, yq
“ lim
nÑ8
Nnÿ
i“1
cni σ
0
X pEni q
“ lim
nÑ8
ż
sPSX
ψn psq dσ0X psq
“
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq , (SI.27)
which completes the proof. 
While Proposition 1 applies to discounted games with λ ă 1, we can get an analogous statement for
undiscounted games by multiplying both sides of Eq. (SI.26) by 1´ λ and taking the limit λÑ 1´:
Corollary 1. If ψ : SX Ñ R is a bounded, measurable function, then, when the limit exists,
lim
TÑ8
1
T ` 1
Tÿ
t“0
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψ pxq ´
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq “ 0 (SI.28)
for any memory-one strategy, σX , where σ
0
X is the initial action of player X.
Theorem 2 (Autocratic strategies in arbitrary action spaces). Suppose that σX rx, ys is a memory-one
strategy for player X and let σ0X be player X’s initial action. If, for some bounded function, ψ, the equation
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.29)
holds for each x P SX and y P SY , then σ0X and σX rx, ys together enforce the linear payoff relationship
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 (SI.30)
for any strategy of player Y . In other words, the pair
´
σ0X , σX rx, ys
¯
is an autocratic strategy.
Proof. If Eq. (SI.29) holds, then by Eq. (SI.26) in Proposition 1,
αpiX`βpiY ` γ ` p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σ0X psq
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
„
ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq

dνt px, yq
“ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq , (SI.31)
16
and it follows at once that αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0. 
SI.2.1. Two-point autocratic strategies.
Corollary 2. Let α, β, γ P R and suppose that there exist s1, s2 P SX (i.e. two discrete actions) and φ ą 0
such that
´1´ p1´ λq p0
φ
ď αuX ps1, yq ` βuY ps1, yq ` γ ď ´p1´ λq p1´ p0q
φ
; (SI.32a)
p1´ λq p0
φ
ď αuX ps2, yq ` βuY ps2, yq ` γ ď λ` p1´ λq p0
φ
(SI.32b)
for each y P SY , where p0 is the probability that X initially uses s1 and 1 ´ p0 is the probability that X
initially uses s2. Let δs be the Dirac measure on S centered at s, and, for x P ts1, s2u and y P SY , consider
the memory-one strategy,
σX rx, ys :“ p px, yq δs1 `
´
1´ p px, yq
¯
δs2 , (SI.33)
where
p ps1, yq :“ 1
λ
´
φ pαuX ps1, yq ` βuY ps1, yq ` γq ´ p1´ λq p0 ` 1
¯
; (SI.34a)
p ps2, yq :“ 1
λ
´
φ pαuX ps2, yq ` βuY ps2, yq ` γq ´ p1´ λq p0
¯
. (SI.34b)
Then, irrespective of player Y ’s strategy, this choice of p0 and σX rx, ys enforces αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0.
Proof. By Theorem 1, we need only show that there exists ψ : ts1, s2u Ñ R such that
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.35)
for each x P SX and y P SY in order to establish the equation αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0. Indeed, since we are
restricting X’s actions to two points, we may assume that SX “ ts1, s2u. Fix ψ ps1q :“ ψ1 P R and let
ψ ps2q :“ 1φ ` ψ1. Since
ψ ps1q´λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rs1, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq
“ ψ1 ´ λ
ˆ
ψ1 ` p1´ p ps1, yqq 1
φ
˙
´ p1´ λq
ˆ
ψ1 ` p1´ p0q 1
φ
˙
“ αuX ps1, yq ` βuY ps1, yq ` γ (SI.36)
and
ψ ps2q´λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rs2, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq
“ 1
φ
` ψ1 ´ λ
ˆ
ψ1 ` p1´ p ps2, yqq 1
φ
˙
´ p1´ λq
ˆ
ψ1 ` p1´ p0q 1
φ
˙
“ αuX ps2, yq ` βuY ps2, yq ` γ, (SI.37)
and since 0 ď p px, yq ď 1 for each x P ts1, s2u and y P SY by Eq. (SI.32), the proof is complete. 
Remark 2. In the undiscounted case (λ “ 1), Eq. (SI.32) is satisfied for some φ ą 0 if and only if there
exist s1, s2 P SX such that
αuX ps1, yq ` βuY ps1, yq ` γ ď 0 ď αuX ps2, yq ` βuY ps2, yq ` γ (SI.38)
for every y P SY . Moreover, if Eq. (SI.32) holds for some λ, p0, φ, and s1, s2 P SX , then it must be true that
Eq. (SI.38) also holds for every y P SY . If Eq. (SI.38) does not hold for a particular choice of s1, s2 P SX ,
then s1 and s2 cannot form a two-point autocratic strategy for any discounting factor, λ. Therefore, Eq.
(SI.38), which is easy to check, offers a straightforward way to show that two actions cannot form a two-point
autocratic strategy for a particular game.
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Remark 3. For ψ, s1, and s2, fixed, one can ask which strategies of the form
σ0X “ p0δs1 ` p1´ p0q δs2 ; (SI.39a)
σX rx, ys “ p px, yq δs1 `
´
1´ p px, yq
¯
δs2 , (SI.39b)
for some p0 and p px, yq, satisfy the equation
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq . (SI.40)
Indeed, we see from the proof of Corollary 2 that, for a strategy of this form, we must have
p px, yq “
ψ ps2q ´ 1λ
´
ψ pxq ´
´
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ ` p1´ λq
´
ψ ps1q p0 ` ψ ps2q p1´ p0q
¯¯¯
ψ ps2q ´ ψ ps1q
(SI.41)
for each x P ts1, s2u and y P SY . Therefore, this simple case does not capture the generally-implicit nature
of autocratic strategies because one can explicitly write down two-point strategies via Eq. (SI.41), which is
typically not possible for strategies concentrated on more than just two actions.
SI.3. Examples
Here we present some simple examples of Theorem 1 and its implications. In §SI.3.1, we demonstrate how
Theorem 1 reduces to the main result of Press and Dyson (2012) when the action space has only two options.
Moreover, we use an action space consisting of three choices to illustrate the implicit nature of autocratic
strategies defined via Press-Dyson functions for more than two actions. In §SI.3.2, we show that there is no
way for a player to unilaterally set her own score using Theorem 1. In particular, despite the implicit nature
of autocratic strategies, one can use Theorem 1 to deduce the non-existence of certain classes of strategies.
SI.3.1. Games with finitely many actions and no discounting. Suppose that SX “ SY “ tA1, . . . , Anu
is finite. If ψ : SX Ñ R and σX is a memory-one strategy, then, for λ “ 1,
ψ pxq´
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq
“ ψ pxq ´
nÿ
r“1
ψ pArqσX rx, ys pArq
“ ψ pxq ´
n´1ÿ
r“1
ψ pArqσX rx, ys pArq ´ ψ pAnq
˜
1´
n´1ÿ
r“1
σX rx, ys pArq
¸
“ ψ pxq ´ ψ pAnq ´
n´1ÿ
r“1
´
ψ pArq ´ ψ pAnq
¯
σX rx, ys pArq
“
$’’’’&’’’’%
n´1ÿ
r“1
´
ψ pAnq ´ ψ pArq
¯´
σX rx, ys pArq ´ δr,r1
¯
x “ Ar1 ‰ An,
n´1ÿ
r“1
´
ψ pAnq ´ ψ pArq
¯
σX rx, ys pArq x “ An.
(SI.42)
Therefore, if n “ 2 and SX “ SY “ tA1, A2u, we have
ψ pxq ´
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq “
´
ψ pA2q ´ ψ pA1q
¯rp. (SI.43)
Thus, a Press-Dyson function is a scalar multiple of rp (defined by Eq. (2) in the main text).
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On the other hand, if n “ 3 and SX “ SY “ tA1, A2, A3u, then
ψ pxq ´
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq “
$’&’%
c1σX rx, ys pA1q ` c2σX rx, ys pA2q ´ c1 x “ A1,
c1σX rx, ys pA1q ` c2σX rx, ys pA2q ´ c2 x “ A2,
c1σX rx, ys pA1q ` c2σX rx, ys pA2q x “ A3,
(SI.44)
where c1 “ ψ pA3q ´ψ pA1q and c2 “ ψ pA3q ´ψ pA2q. For each x P SX and y P SY , the measure σX rx, ys is
uniquely determined by σX rx, ys pA1q and σX rx, ys pA2q. Therefore, unlike for n “ 2, one cannot necessarily
eliminate both of c1 and c2 by normalizing the Press-Dyson function. For this reason, as well as due to the
fact that a Press-Dyson function reduces to a multiple of the Press-Dyson vector for n “ 2, it is perhaps
more natural to refer to any multiple of rp (as opposed to just rp itself) as a Press-Dyson vector.
SI.3.2. Continuous Donation Game. Here we establish some further results claimed in the main text for
extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the continuous Donation Game.
SI.3.2.1. Relationship to the classical Donation Game. For a two-point strategy, X’s action space may be
restricted to SX “ t0,Ku. Therefore, the scaling function ψ : SX Ñ R of Theorem 1 is defined by two
numbers, ψ p0q and ψ pKq. Letting φ :“ 1{ pψ p0q ´ ψ pKqq, we see by Corollary 2 in §SI.2 that the function
p px, yq :“
$&%
1
λ
´
1´ φ
´
χb pKq ` c pKq ´ b pyq ´ χc pyq ´ pχ´ 1qκ
¯
´ p1´ λq p0
¯
x “ K,
1
λ
´
φ
´
b pyq ` χc pyq ` pχ´ 1qκ
¯
´ p1´ λq p0
¯
x “ 0 (SI.45)
gives well-defined reaction probabilities provided ψ (hence φ) and p0 are chosen so that 0 ď p px, yq ď 1 for
each x P t0,Ku and y P r0,Ks. For any such ψ, the memory-one strategy,
σX rx, ys :“
´
1´ p px, yq
¯
δ0 ` p px, yq δK , (SI.46)
together with σ0X “ p1´ p0q δ0 ` p0δK , defines an autocratic strategy that allows X to enforce the linear
relationship
piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq . (SI.47)
Note Eq. (SI.46) simply states formally that player X fully cooperates with probability p px, yq and defects
with probability 1´ p px, yq following an outcome in which X plays x and Y plays y.
In the absence of discounting, i.e. in the limit λÑ 1, we have
p pK,Kq “ 1´ φ pχ´ 1q
´
b pKq ´ c pKq ´ κ
¯
; (SI.48a)
p pK, 0q “ 1´ φ
´
χb pKq ` c pKq ´ pχ´ 1qκ
¯
; (SI.48b)
p p0,Kq “ φ
´
b pKq ` χc pKq ` pχ´ 1qκ
¯
; (SI.48c)
p p0, 0q “ φ pχ´ 1qκ. (SI.48d)
Thus, setting b :“ b pKq, and c :“ c pKq, the general form, Eq. (SI.48), recovers the discrete-action-space
case, Eq. (6). In particular, the autocratic memory-one strategy in Eq. (SI.46) is a direct generalization of
zero-determinant strategies to the continuous Donation Game. However, this strategy contains much more
information than the corresponding strategy for the classical Donation Game because it encodes X’s play in
response to Y ’s for every y P r0,Ks. Despite the fact that player Y has an uncountably infinite number of
actions to choose from, player X can still ensure that Eq. (SI.47) holds by playing only two actions.
SI.3.2.2. Extortionate and generous strategies. In the main text, we saw that X can unilaterally enforce
piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq for χ ě 1 provided 0 ď κ ď b pKq ´ c pKq and λ is sufficiently close to 1. If χ “ 1,
then κ is irrelevant and the linear relationship is simply piX “ piY . Here, we show that, if χ ą 1, then
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Figure 4. Extortion in the continuous Donation Game without discounting. (A) shows
linear costs, c psq “ 2s, and saturating benefits, b pc psqq “ 5 `1´ e´cpsq˘. In (B), the
reaction function of player X, p px, yq “ p pyq (see Eq. (8)), indicates the probability that
player X plays K (as opposed to 0) after Y uses y and represents a reactive strategy
because it depends solely on Y ’s previous move. In (C), the function ψ psq “ ´χb psq ´
c psq is shown together with two dashed lines indicating ψpxq and ş
sPSX ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq,
respectively, for x “ 0.3 where σX rx, ys denotes the memory-one strategy for player X
based on the reactive strategy in (A). The vertical distance between the dashed lines must
equal αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ uX px, yq ´ χuY px, yq for each x, y P r0, 2s to satisfy
Theorem 1. Parameters: λ “ 1, κ “ 0, α “ 1, β “ ´2, and γ “ 0, yielding an extortion
factor of χ :“ ´β “ 2.
0 ď κ ď b pKq ´ c pKq is necessary for such a payoff relationship to be enforced via Theorem 1. Indeed, if´
uX px, yq ´ κ
¯
´ χ
´
uY px, yq ´ κ
¯
“ ´χb pxq ´ c pxq ` b pyq ` χc pyq ` pχ´ 1qκ
“ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq
(SI.49)
for some bounded ψ : SX Ñ R and each x P SX and y P SY , then we obtain
pχ´ 1q ě supψ ´ λ supψ ´ p1´ λq supψ “ 0 (SI.50)
by taking y “ 0 and letting ψ pxq approach supψ, and we see that
´χb pKq ´ c pKq ` b pKq ` χc pKq ` pχ´ 1qκ ď inf ψ ´ λ inf ψ ´ p1´ λq inf ψ “ 0 (SI.51)
by taking y “ K and letting ψ pxq approach inf ψ. Since χ ą 1, we have 0 ď κ ď b pKq ´ c pKq.
SI.3.2.3. Opponent-equalizing strategies. Although a player cannot set her own score in the continuous Do-
nation Game, she can set the score of her opponent. We saw in the main text that X can set Y ’s score to
anything between 0 and b pKq ´ c pKq provided λ is sufficiently large, and here we show that this interval is
the only range of payoffs for player Y that X can unilaterally set via Theorem 1. Indeed, if γ satisfies
uY px, yq ´ γ “ b pxq ´ c pyq ´ γ
“ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.52)
for some bounded ψ : SX Ñ R and each x P SX and y P SY , then we obtain
´γ ď inf ψ ´ λ inf ψ ´ p1´ λq inf ψ “ 0 (SI.53)
by taking y “ 0 and letting ψ pxq approach inf ψ, and we find that
b pKq ´ c pKq ´ γ ě supψ ´ λ supψ ´ p1´ λq supψ “ 0 (SI.54)
by taking y “ K and letting ψ pxq approach supψ. It follows immediately that 0 ď γ ď b pKq ´ c pKq.
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SI.3.2.4. Self-equalizing strategies. We saw in the main text that extortionate strategies exist in the contin-
uous Donation Game, as demonstrated by the two-point strategy defined by Eq. (8). However, it certainly
need not be the case that for any α, β, γ P R, there exists ψ : SX Ñ R such that
αuX px, yq ` βuY px, yq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.55)
for some
´
σ0X , σX rx, ys
¯
and each x P SX and y P SY . For example suppose that α “ 1, β “ 0, and γ is
some fixed real number. For uX px, yq “ b pyq ´ c pxq, the equation
b pyq ´ c pxq ´ γ “ uX px, yq ´ γ “ ψ pxq ´ λ
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.56)
holds for some ψ : SX Ñ R and
´
σ0X , σX rx, ys
¯
, only if
λ inf ψ ď ψ pxq ` c pxq ` γ ´ b pyq ´ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ď λ supψ (SI.57)
for each x, y P r0,Ks. However, these inequalities imply that
p1´ λq inf ψ ě p1´ λq supψ `
´
b pKq ´ c pKq
¯
, (SI.58)
which is impossible since b pKq ą c pKq and inf ψ ď supψ. Thus, there is no feasible Press-Dyson function
that allows player X to unilaterally enforce the equation piX “ γ. In other words, a player cannot unilaterally
set her own payoff.
SI.3.2.5. Initial actions. Here we state the conditions on p0 (for two-point strategies) and x0 (for determin-
istic strategies) that allow X to enforce autocratic strategies in the continuous Donation Game.
If p0 denotes the probability that X initially plays x “ K (as opposed to x “ 0), then the function
ppx, yq “ 1
λ
¨˝
b pyq ` χc pyq ` pχ´ 1qκ´ p1´ λq
´
χb pKq ` c pKq
¯
p0
χb pKq ` c pKq ‚˛ (SI.59)
gives a well-defined reaction probability provided λ satisfies Eq. (7) in the main text and p0 satisfies
max
$&% pχ´ 1qκ´ λ
´
χb pKq ` c pKq
¯
`
´
b pKq ` χc pKq
¯
p1´ λq
´
χb pKq ` c pKq
¯ , 0
,.-
ď p0 ď min
$&% pχ´ 1qκp1´ λq´χb pKq ` c pKq¯ , 1
,.- . (SI.60)
Moreover, for such a p0 and p px, yq, the two-point strategy defined by
σ0X “ p1´ p0q δ0 ` p0δK ; (SI.61a)
σX rx, ys “
´
1´ p px, yq
¯
δ0 ` p px, yq δK (SI.61b)
allows X to enforce piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq. This reaction probability was obtained using the scaling function
ψ psq :“ ´χb psq ´ c psq on SX “ t0,Ku.
If X wishes to enforce piY “ γ for 0 ď γ ď b pKq ´ c pKq, she may use ψ psq :“ b psq on SX “ t0,Ku and
p px, yq “ 1
λ
ˆ
c pyq ` γ
b pKq ´ p1´ λq p0
˙
, (SI.62)
provided λ ě c pKq {b pKq and
max
"
γ ´ λb pKq ` c pKq
p1´ λq b pKq , 0
*
ď p0 ď min
"
γ
p1´ λq b pKq , 1
*
. (SI.63)
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Using ψ psq :“ ´χb psq ´ c psq on SX “ r0,Ks, X can also enforce piX ´ κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq using the
deterministic strategy with reaction function
rX px, yq “ ψ´1
ˆ´b pyq ´ χc pyq ´ pχ´ 1qκ´ p1´ λqψ px0q
λ
˙
, (SI.64)
where ψ´1 p¨ ¨ ¨ q denotes the inverse of the function ψ, provided Eq. (7) holds and X’s initial action, x0,
satisfies
pχ´ 1qκ´ λ
´
χb pKq ` c pKq
¯
`
´
b pKq ` χc pKq
¯
1´ λ ď χb px0q ` c px0q ď
pχ´ 1qκ
1´ λ . (SI.65)
For X to set piY “ γ for 0 ď γ ď b pKq´ c pKq using a deterministic strategy, then she can do so by using
ψ psq :“ b psq and the reaction function
rX px, yq “ ψ´1
ˆ
c pyq ` γ ´ p1´ λqψ px0q
λ
˙
, (SI.66)
provided λ ě c pKq {b pKq and X’s initial action, x0, satisfies
γ ´ λb pKq ` c pKq
1´ λ ď b px0q ď
γ
1´ λ. (SI.67)
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